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Steven L. Schooner  
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The George Washington University Law School 
David J. Berteau  
Director of the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group  
Center for Strategic and International Studies  
Washington D.C.
I. THE POST-MILLENIUM PROCUREMENT SPENDING BINGE IS OVER: WILL PRO-
CUREMENT SPENDING PLATEAU OR DECLINE?
A. The New Economic Reality (Finally). Procurement spending decreased, significantly, last 
year.
B. Below $500 Billion: The Decrease in Federal Procurement Spending is a Landmark 
Event. Regular attendees of this conference are familiar with this chapter’s coverage of the post-
millennium federal procurement spending trend. Last year’s decrease marks the end of an era. The 
post-millennial binge is significant not only for its longevity but for its size. Keep in mind that, in 
Fiscal Year 2001, federal procurement spending rose to just over $223 billion. The following years, 
in 2002 and 2003, we witnessed 18 and 20 percent spending increases. After steady increases in the 
middle of the decade, we reached an unprecedented plateau, where federal procurement spending 
stabilized at just over $540 billion for four fiscal years, from 2008 through 2011. We now know that, 
in 2009, we experienced the first decrease in federal procurement spending for well over a decade (but 
it took a number of years for the data to catch up). Then, in 2013, it appears we finally experienced 
the first dramatic decline in spending and a plunge below the (oh-so-dramatic) $500 billion threshold 
that the government exceeded from 2008 through 2012.
Using adjusted figures (yes, between the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) and USAS-
pending.gov, history is consistently being re-written), it appears that the annual increases in federal 
procurement were most dramatic from 2001 through 2008, typically running at more than three times 
the rate of inflation. The experts correctly predicted that the growth rate eventually would taper; in 
2009, the rate slowed and, apparently, growth finally stalled. Yet, in retrospect, the dire warnings 
that the current spending binge was a blip – and that procurement spending would promptly retract 
– unfolded far more slowly than anyone expected. Indeed, the recently adjusted numbers paint a 
picture of extraordinary spending consistency – from 2008 through 2011 – that appears as quirky 
as it is accidental. 
The chart below summarizes the empirical evidence that the procurement spending growth 
cycle finally has run its course. The $500+ billion plateau represented the high end of a robust and 
sustained growth curve. Now, time will tell how far the reductions will go and whether they can be 
sustained. It will be fascinating to see how long it takes until the government again crosses the $500 
billion threshold.
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Federal Procurement Spending 2001-2013* 
Fiscal 
Year 
Procurement 
Spending (in Billions 
of Dollars) 
Percentage Increase 
or (Decrease†) From 
Previous Year 
Percentage Increase in 
Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) 
2013 $463.4* (12) 1.7 
2012 $520.9 (4) 3.0 
2011 $541.5 0 1.5 
2010 $541.5  0 2.7 
2009 $541.0  0 0.1 
2008  $542.1  14 4.1 
2007 $469.5  10 2.5 
2006 $432.0 10 3.4 
2005 $392.1  13 3.3 
2004 $346.3 9 1.9 
2003 $318.1  21 2.4 
2002 $263.4 18 1.6 
2001 $223.1   
*FY 2013 figures reflect only an estimate based upon preliminary reporting. 
† Parentheticals reflect negative numbers. 
See www.USASpending.gov. Annual increases in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban 
Consumers (CPI-U) were extracted from the annual Detailed Report Tables and the Table 
Containing History of CPI-U U.S. All Items Indexes and Annual Percent Changes From 1913 
to Present, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, available at 
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/#tables.  
 
C. A Band Aid Is Better Than Chaos. The (dominant, inescapable) 
emerging issue, looking ahead, is that the government spent less money 
last year and, most likely, will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. 
Unfortunately, throughout 2013, far too much attention was consumed 
by political brinksmanship, budgetary chicanery, teetering on the edge 
of the so-called fiscal cliff, and sequestration threats, preparations, and 
aftermath. See OMB Highlights Costs of Recent Federal Shutdown, 55 GC 
¶ 368; GAO Reviews DOD’s Approach to Sequestration Spending Cuts, 55 
GC ¶ 367; Military Brass Warn of Sequestration’s Impact on Readiness, 55 
GC ¶ 365; CR Funding, Sequestration Threaten DOD Multiyear Procure-
ments, 55 GC ¶ 356; CR Funding and Sequestration Threaten Military 
Acquisition, Panel Warns, 55 GC ¶ 338; DOD Coping With Continuing 
FY 2014 Budget Impasse, 55 GC ¶ 320; Limited Options for Contractors, 
Protestors if Federal Shutdown Continues, 55 GC ¶ 312; Military Leaders 
Outline Risks of Continuing Sequestration, 55 GC ¶ 293; Sequestration and 
Budget Cuts Severely Damaging Military Readiness, Hagel Tells Senate 
Committee, 55 GC ¶ 225; OMB Reports Provide Early Look At FY 2014 
Sequestration Cuts, 55 GC ¶ 128; DOD Witnesses Discuss Sequestration 
Budget Cuts, 55 GC ¶ 75; President Issues Sequestration Order, 55 GC 
¶ 65; Elizabeth Ferrel et al., Feature Comment: Looming Fiscal Crisis 
Increases Pressure for Another Round of Base Closures, 55 GC ¶ 49; DOD 
Prepares for Cuts, Leaders Want Permanent Sequestration Action, 55 GC 
¶ 12; President Signs Fiscal Cliff Legislation, Postponing Sequestration, 
55 GC ¶ 11.
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At least for now, there appears to be some amount of short-term budget 
stability. No doubt, there is significantly less money to go around, but we’ll 
take certainty (even short-term certainty) over chaos for the foreseeably 
future.
D. The Chasm Between Contracts and Grants Begins to Shrink. 
Plenty of contracting experts assert that, fundamentally, not much dis-
tinguishes a government contract from a federal grant. Despite all of the 
attention focused upon (and burdensome oversight associated with) gov-
ernment contracting, grant spending continues to outpace procurement 
spending. Consistent with the trend we’ve previously reported, grant 
spending exceeded procurement spending last year, as it has for eleven of 
the last thirteen years. We long expected that, eventually, the oversight and 
regulatory community would shift its focus from procurement to grants. 
And, if the government is serious about reducing its debts and its annual 
deficits, such a shift in emphasis seemed unavoidable. 
Federal Procurement and Grant Spending  
2001-2013* 
Fiscal 
Year 
Procurement Spending  
(in Billions)  
Grant Spending 
(in Billions) 
2013 463.4* $524.3* 
2012 $520.9 $539.5 
2011 $541.5 $566.9 
2010 $541.5 $614.3 
2009 $541.0 $665.0 
2008 $542.1 $419.7 
2007 $469.5 $430.2 
2006 $432.0 $490.0 
2005 $392.1 $441.7 
2004 $346.3 $450.1 
2003 $318.1 $493.7 
2002 $263.4 $406.3 
2001 $223.1 $330.8 
*FY 2013 figures reflect only an estimate based upon preliminary 
reporting. 
See Total Federal Spending, www.USASpending.gov. 
 
This year, finally, the government announced a significant revamping 
of the regulatory regime surrounding grants. See Uniform Administra-
tive Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal 
Awards, 78 Fed. Reg. 78590 (Dec. 26, 2013) (amending and replacing 2 
C.F.R. Chapter I, and Chapter II, Parts 200, 215, 220, 225, and 230), avail-
able at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-12-26/pdf/2013-30465.
pdf. See also, the 35-minute webcast, Improving Outcomes by Reducing 
Red Tape for Financial Assistance, available at https://cfo.gov/cofar/. 
Weighing in at exactly 100 pages of (very) small print, this should provide 
significant employment opportunities for attorneys, compliance special-
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ists, and grants experts. To the extent that the new guidance “eliminate[s] 
numerous overlapping duplicative and conflicting provisions of guidance,” 
we applaud OMB.
Readers may be somewhat disoriented, however, by the seemingly con-
tradictory goals of the regulatory initiative. The final guidance explains, 
on the one hand: “This reform … will improve the integrity of the financial 
management and operation of Federal programs and strengthen account-
ability for Federal dollars by improving policies that protect against waste, 
fraud, and abuse.” Simultaneously, however, the government anticipates 
that “this reform will increase the impact and accessibility of programs 
by minimizing time spent complying with unnecessarily burdensome 
administrative requirements….” 78 Fed. Reg. 78590. The history of ac-
quisition reform suggests that the government typically seeks either to 
increase accountability or increase efficiency. For example, cynics may also 
be intrigued to see the smooth transition, in the introductory passages, 
from provisions that “allow Federal agencies some additional flexibility to 
waive some requirements (… [and the] option to apply to OMB to waive 
requirements) that impede their capacity to achieve better outcomes” to 
touting that the “guidance will provide a backbone for sound financial 
management[.]” We remain skeptical that this regulatory initiative will 
simultaneously and seamlessly achieve both stated ends.
Consistent with DoD’s performance report (discussed below), it is 
encouraging to see that OMB’s initiative “includes provisions that focus 
on performance over compliance to provide accountability for Federal 
funds.” OMB included “more robust guidance to Federal agencies to mea-
sure performance in a way that will help … improve program outcomes, 
share lessons learned, and spread the adoption of promising practices 
… [and] provide recipients with clear performance goals, indicators, and 
milestones.”
Few stones appear unturned. The guidance addresses efficient use of 
Information Technology (IT) and shared services. Cost issues – policies 
on direct and indirect costs and other limitations on allowable costs – re-
ceive significant treatment. Acquisition experts who have experienced the 
seamless implementation and improvements associated with the Central 
Contractor Registry (CCR) will take comfort in learning that: “The final 
guidance includes provisions that set the stage for Federal agencies to 
manage Federal awards via standardized business process and use of 
consistently defined data elements.” The private sector may not be quite 
as convinced that “[t]his will reduce administrative burden on non-Federal 
entities[.]” Social policies (such as family-friendly policies) find a place in 
the regulatory regime as well. For example:
Provisions … provide flexibilities that better allow non-
Federal entities to … allow their employees to balance their 
personal responsibilities while maintaining successful careers 
contributing to Federal awards…. These provisions allow 
for policies that ease dependent care costs when attending 
conferences [an issue which has, in the past, prevented] more 
women from maintaining careers in science.
9-4
© 2014 Thomson Reuters
NOTES
Apparently, the scientific community’s conferences have not been taint-
ed, stigmatized, and disparaged as part of the otherwise government-wide 
Congressional crack-down on conferences and educational programming. 
Nonetheless, of course, oversight, accountability, and compliance feature 
prominently in the new regime.
The final guidance right-sizes the footprint of oversight and 
Single Audit requirements to strengthen oversight and focus 
audits where there is greatest risk of waste, fraud, and abuse of 
taxpayer dollars. It improves transparency and accountability 
by making single audit reports available to the public online, 
and encourages Federal agencies to take a more cooperative 
approach to audit resolution in order to more conclusively 
resolve underlying weaknesses in internal controls.
See also Chapter 12 (of these materials), Federally Supported Research 
& Development. 
E. Correlating the Protest Trend? Consistent with the above-refer-
enced plateau and reduction in federal procurement spending, it appears 
that, as 2013 concludes, the recent growth trend in GAO bid protests ap-
pears to have stalled (well below the all-time high seen in the early 1990’s). 
See Chapter Six (of these materials), Bid Protest Overview, and GAO Bid 
Protest Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2013, GAO-14-276SP 
(indicating that the number of new protests declined by two percent in 
2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-276SP. It is 
too early to tell if this is a blip in the trend line or a meaningful behav-
ioral change. Also, based upon earlier research, we are not yet persuaded 
that the protest rate directly corresponds to the spending trend. Readers 
interested in these issues should also see the intriguing (and ongoing) 
cost-benefit research on bid protests that looks beyond the statistics posted 
annually by GAO. Daniel I. Gordon, Bid Protests: The Costs Are Real, but 
the Benefits Outweigh Them, 42, PuB. Cont. L. J. 489 (2013).
II. A NEW YEAR: A NEW OFPP ADMINISTRATOR? 
By the time the Year in Review Conference convenes, it appears that 
Joe Jordan will have stepped down as Administrator for the Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP). OMB informally summarized his 
tenure, noting that he was “a driving force behind administration procure-
ment initiatives, including eliminating inefficiencies and buying smarter 
through strategic sourcing and shared services; improving contractor ac-
countability and fighting waste, fraud, and abuse through the increased 
use of suspensions and debarments; stopping the excessive reimburse-
ment for contractor executives; and making it easier for small businesses 
to contract with the federal government.” Jason Miller, OFPP’s Jordan 
leaving for the private sector, (Dec. 20, 2013) (citing OMB Director Sylvia 
Burwell), available at http://www.federalnewsradio.com/517/3529122/
OFPPs-Jordan-leaving-for-the-private-sector. 
Jordan “will be joining FedBid as President of Public Sector … [to] 
help grow and manage FedBid’s Federal Buyer base, while driving addi-
tional growth in the State, Local and Education (SLED) sectors. Jordan 
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will also assist with the company’s recent private sector launch, a move 
to open commercial businesses of all sizes to buy commodity goods and 
simple services in the online marketplace.” FedBid Press Release, FedBid 
Announces Hire of White House Procurement Policy Chief Joseph Jordan, 
(Dec. 20, 2013), available at http://finance.yahoo.com/news/fedbid-
announces-hire-white-house-184600163.html. Apparently, Lesley Field, 
the deputy administrator, will once again serve as acting administrator 
for an indefinite period.
III. DEFENSE TRENDS
A. Change at the Top. Deputy Secretary of Defense Aston (Ash) B. 
Carter, formerly USD (AT&L), announced he would step down at the end 
of 2013. Many will remember Carter as the driving force behind the origi-
nal Better Buying Power (BBP) initiative. See, e.g., http://bbp.dau.mil/. 
His parting gift appears to be an interim revised DOD 5000 series docu-
ment, with a mandate that a revised document be prepared in 180 days. 
See http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/500002_interim.
pdf. USD(AT&L) Frank Kendall’s summary of the document explains 
that it was intended to implement post-2008 statutes and regulations, 
integrate certain BPP initiatives (such as “should cost analysis”) into 
the document, reinforce the importance and primacy of the program 
managers (PM’s) and the program executive officers (PEO’s), increase 
readability, and make the document more helpful to relevant acquisition 
professionals. USD(AT&L) Memorandum for the Acquisition Workforce, 
The New Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02 (Dec. 02, 2013), 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/docs/2013_12_03%20Signed%20Kendall%20
Distro%20Memo.pdf. See also, USD(AT&L) Memorandum, Implementation 
Directive for Better Buying Power 2.0 - Achieving Greater Efficiency and 
Productivity in Defense Spending (Apr. 24, 2013), http://image.exct.net/
lib/fefd167774640c/d/1/USD.ATL.BBP%202.0%20Implementation%20
Directive%2024%20Apr%2013.pdf. 
We are heartened by the refinement of the message as BBP evolves. 
USD(AT&L) Kendall appears to have fundamentally changed the tone of 
BBP and, in so doing, increased the prospects for incremental improve-
ment. Among other things, BBP 2.0 emphasized that:
• The first responsibility of the acquisition workforce is to 
think.....
• [Q]ualified people are essential to successful outcomes[,] and 
professionalism ... drives results more than any policy change.
• [A]cquisition fundamentals work.... [B]asics would include ... 
effective incentives to industry[;] ... understanding and active 
management of technical risk[;] ... demonstrated progress before 
major commitments; ... and .. using the right contract type of the 
job.
B. Information Is Power: Watching the Trends. While the govern-
ment dutifully plugs data into its mandatory databases, such as FPDS, 
we continue to be interested in analysis of more sophisticated data that 
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provides better, more accessible insights into how the federal govern-
ment’s procurement dollars are spent. A number of additional reports 
and studies build upon data we have previously reported. See, e.g., David 
J. Berteau, Gregory Sanders, Jesse Ellman & Rhys McCormick, U.S. De-
partment of Defense Contract Spending and the Supporting Industrial 
Base, 2000– 2012, A Report of the CSIS National Security Program on 
Industry and Resources (December 2013), available at http://csis.org/
files/publication/131207_Sanders_DODContractSpending_Web.pdf. 
Highlights include:
• The overall DoD budget began to drop in 2011, but 2012 marked 
the third year of decline for DoD service contract obligations 
and the fourth year for all other contracts. This decline leaves 
contract obligations at 55 percent of total DoD outlays, well 
below the 62 percent share in 2000 and the 69 percent share 
in 2008. Nonetheless, in 2012 constant dollar terms, the $361 
billion spent on contracts in FY2012 exceeds the defense con-
tract obligations from any year between 2000 and 2006.
• The changes over recent years have not been evenly distributed.
- The Army’s share of DoD contract obligations rose from 
28 percent in 2000 to a peak of 40 percent in 2008, as Iraq 
and Afghanistan drove spending priorities. With the draw 
down, Army contract obligations declined at nearly three 
times the overall DoD rate, leaving the Army with a 30 
percent share in 2012. 
- The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the category of 
“Other DoD” components (which includes all contracting 
entities within DoD that are not covered by the other four 
component categories, such as the Missile Defense Agency 
(MDA), TRICARE, and US Transportation Command (US-
TRANSCOM)) also rose and have retained a notably higher 
share of contract obligations even during drawdown. 
- The Navy’s share of DoD obligations fell through 2005 and 
stayed somewhat steady, although 2012 saw a sharp (11 
percent) decline from 2011. 
- The Air Force share grew by 5 percent from 2011 to 2012, 
after losing share over the previous 10 years. 
• Product purchasing rose from 46 percent in 2000 to a high of 
51 percent in 2008, before falling back to 45 percent by 2010.
• The share of defense contract obligations awarded for Services 
hovered between 39 percent and 42 percent between 2000 and 
2008, but rose to a high of 44 percent in 2010.
- R&D, which accounted for a high of 15 percent of defense 
contract obligations in 2002, has declined steadily since, 
to a low of 10 percent in 2011 and 2012. 
• The share of defense contract obligations awarded without com-
petition rose from 38 percent in 2000 to 42 percent in 2012. The 
share of defense contract obligations awarded after competition 
with two offers has declined steadily, from 25 percent in 2000 to 
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14 percent in 2012, due in large part to an increase in the number 
of competitive offers. Overall, the share of contract obligations 
awarded after competition with three or more offers has risen from 
25 percent in 2000 to 34 percent in 2012, with the vast majority 
of that rise attributable to cases with five or more offers. 
• Between 2011 and 2012, contract obligations awarded with-
out competition declined more slowly than overall defense (-2 
percent), rising as a share of overall defense contract obliga-
tions from 41 percent to 42 percent. In that year, the share of 
competed contract dollars awarded after a single offer declined 
sharply (-22 percent), in line with current policy guidance, fall-
ing from 10 percent of contract obligations to 8 percent. Both 
competition with two offers (-9 percent) and competition with 
three or four offers (-14 percent) declined more rapidly than did 
overall defense. Competition with five or more offers actually 
saw growth (5 percent) even as overall defense declined, rising 
as a share of overall defense from 19 percent to 21 percent.
• The rise of indefinite delivery contracts coincided with a move 
to larger contracts. The share of defense contract obligations 
awarded in contracts of less than $1 million has gradually de-
clined, from 20 percent in 2000 to 14 percent in 2012. The share 
of obligations awarded for contracts between $1 million and 
$25 million declined from 37 percent in 2000 to 31 percent in 
2008, and fluctuated between 32 percent and 34 percent since 
then. The share awarded for contracts between $25 million 
and $500 million have fluctuated between 30 percent and 35 
percent throughout the period. Contracts of $500 million and 
greater grew from an 11 percent share in 2000 to a 22 percent 
share of contract obligations by 2012, even seeing slight growth 
(3 percent) in real terms from 2011 to 2012, despite declines in 
overall DoD contract obligations. 
• When comparing the top 20 vendors in 2002 and 2012, there 
has been a moderate broadening of the defense industrial base. 
In 2002, the top 5 defense vendors accounted for 34 percent of 
total defense contract obligations versus 27 percent in 2012. 
Similarly, the top 20 accounted for 47 percent of total defense 
contract obligations in 2002, compared to 43 percent in 2012.
- The top 5 defense vendors remained unchanged between 
2002 and 2012, although their order has shifted.
- The most notable additions to the top 20 in 2012 were 
the three fuel supply-related vendors: Royal Dutch Shell, 
Supreme Group, and BP. 
C. The Defense Department Considers Metrics. As much as 
we are intrigued by this type of number-crunching, arguably, the most 
thought-provoking reading of the year comes out of DoD’s performance, 
outcome, or metrics initiative. Plenty of readers will be disappointed with 
the often-vanilla presentation. But the report is frank, well organized, 
clear (and surprisingly free of obfuscation), and chock-full of intriguing 
observations and conclusions. Some highlights include:
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• Analysis of historical Major Defense Acquisition Program 
(MDAP) contracts revealed no statistical correlation between 
the use of contract type (e.g., cost-plus and fixed-price types) 
and lower cost or schedule growth. In other words, the type of 
contract used in each case did not result in a statistically 
significant difference in cost growth.
• The Army has both the largest number of canceled programs 
and the largest percentage of sunk RDT&E costs…. The major-
ity of the Army’s sunk funding … was due to the cancellation 
of the Future Combat System (FCS); however, every year from 
1996 to 2010, the Army spent more than $1 billion annually on 
programs that ultimately were canceled.
• Undefinitized contract actions (UCAs) had a measurable in-
crease on total contract cost growth and also on cycle time in 
development.
• The time required to acquire next-generation capabilities is 
often longer than the strategic threat and technology cycles 
these capabilities are meant to address.
• Acquisition is about risk management—not certainties. ... [I]
t is important to remember that developing technologically 
superior military capability is not a risk-free endeavor...
• Intelligent acquisition is key.
• Programs with bad starts often continue to have problems. 
• Performance relative to original baselines does not guarantee 
lowest end cost to the taxpayers.
• Performance across all MDAPs at the program level is highly 
skewed, with a few outliers with extremely high cost growth, 
a large population with moderate cost growth, and a small 
number with negative or negligible cost growth.
• Affordability will be a major challenge in the next few years.
AT&L Issues First Defense Acquisition System Performance Report, 55 
GC ¶ 214, available at http://bbp.dau.mil/doc/Report_on_the_Perfor-
mance_of_the_Def_Acq_System.pdf. 
It is very early in the process, and it is difficult to anticipate the depth 
of DoD’s commitment to this initiative. But we applaud DoD’s effort to 
evolve past a fascination with our longstanding, generally unhelpful, 
and popular-primarily-because-they’re-easy-to-measure metrics (price, 
schedule, performance specifications) associated with the award – rather 
than the outcome – of the contract. Specifically, increased attention to 
quantifying value for money spent and customer satisfaction obtained 
would be a step in the right direction.
D. Difficult Times Require Critical Thinking. We applaud BAE’s 
CEO, Linda Hudson, for organizing and giving voice to at least some of the 
private sector’s anxiety about its business partner. Among other things, 
she articulated that:
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[L]ike others doing business with the Government, we have 
been blown by budget winds into three fiscal cliffs in barely 
more than a year and a half....
[There] is a howling gale of contradictions between the nation’s 
long-term fiscal direction and the realities of an increasingly 
unstable and dangerous world....
[T]he [Pentagon’s] procurement system is not just failing to 
partner with industry. Often, it is downright hostile to us….
We are in danger of being swept over by a rising, increasingly 
expensive and exhausting wave of regulations and disclosure 
requirements unrelated to our mission.
Linda Hudson, Feature Comment: The Perfect Storm for Defense, 55 GC ¶ 
119. We wish that more business executives would be as frank and clear. 
See also, Loren Thompson, Five Reasons Defense Companies Need to Start 
Getting Out of Defense, forBes (Sept. 23, 2013) (discussing changes in 
threats, politics, budgets, economics, and opinions), available at http://
www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2013/09/23/five-reasons-defense-
companies-need-to-start-getting-out-of-defense/. And, of course, the House 
Armed Services Committee recently launched “a long-term effort to reform 
the Department of Defense including a hard look at acquisition” with two 
October hearings. See, e.g., http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/
durable-defense-reform.
IV. THE ACQUISITION WORKFORCE: ANOTHER LOST YEAR
There is little point in lamenting the derailing of any serious effort to 
restock the depleted and graying acquisition workforce. Moreover, in 2013, 
rather than commit additional funds or energy to training, this year’s focus 
was on reducing duplicative (or, arguably, increasing efficiency) expendi-
tures on training. See generally, Joseph G. Jordan, Memorandum for Chief 
Acquisition Officers and Senior Procurement Executives, Increasing Effi-
ciencies in the Training, Development, and Management of the Acquisition 
Workforce (Sept. 3, 2013) (tasking the Federal Acquisition Institute (FAI) 
to lead acquisition workforce initiatives that will: (1) reduce duplication 
of workforce management information systems, and (2) leverage scarce 
training resources across agencies), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/sites/default/files/omb/procurement/memo/increasing-efficiencies-
in-the-training-development-and-management-of-the-acquisition-work-
force.pdf. See also, IGs Challenged to Maintain Budgets, Retain Skilled 
Workforce, Survey Shows, 55 GC ¶ 296; State Has Not Accomplished Key 
Goals of Procurement Services, 55 GC ¶ 190 (a significant chunk of the one-
percent fee subsidized other activities that operated at a loss rather than 
the three acquisition-related goals: performance measurement, customer 
service, and continuous improvement); As DOD Workforce Shrinks, Effort 
to Determine Appropriate Mix Lags, GAO Reports, 55 GC ¶ 182 (which, 
among other things, pounds the drum for more data on contractor FTE’s); 
Tricare Acquisition Workforce Needs Better Oversight, DOD IG Says, 55 
GC ¶ 146; Agencies Have Limited Insight Into Costs, Benefits of Acquisi-
tion Workforce Training, 55 GC ¶ 127, www.gao.gov/assets/660/653437.
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pdfwww.gao.gov/assets/660/653437.pdf (“The shortage of trained ac-
quisition personnel hinders agencies from managing and overseeing ac-
quisition programs and contracts that have become more expensive and 
increasingly complex[.]” Nonetheless, “[12] of the 23 agencies ‘did not have 
insight into whether their acquisition workforce training investment is 
improving individual skills or agency performance,’ including seven that 
did not have any metrics.”); DOT Can Improve Acquisition Workforce Data 
Collection, Management, 55 GC ¶ 31; Acquisition Workforce in “Unabated 
Crisis,” Survey Says, 55 GC ¶ 5. It is difficult to be optimistic about major 
investment in the acquisition workforce in light of the current economic 
realities. But we join those who identify inadequacy of the government’s 
approach to investing in its acquisition workforce:
It is time to fundamentally rethink and revise current 
human capital strategies, including planning, development, 
performance management, and, in some cases, structures. It 
must be recognized that whatever has been done for the last two 
decades simply is not delivering the desired results, and future-
focused human capital initiatives must not be based on present 
or past presumptions. …
Collaboration must become a central component of government 
operations, internally and externally. … [A]ll participants, 
inside and outside of government, must be working toward and 
evaluated against a set of common performance and mission 
measures.
Professional Services Council, Report of the 2013 PSC Leadership Com-
mission, From Crisis to Opportunity Creating a New Era of Government 
Efficiency, Innovation and Performance (2013), available at http://www.
pscouncil.org/c/p/2013_Commission_Report/The_2013_PSC_Leader-
ship_Commission_Report.aspx. 
V. CYBERSECURITY: THE EVOLVING WILD CARD
In November, after a lengthy process, DOD promulgated the new 
cybersecurity rule. See 78 Fed. Reg. 69273 (Nov. 18, 2013) (“This final 
rule addresses safeguarding requirements that cover only unclassified 
controlled technical information and reporting the compromise of unclassi-
fied controlled technical information.”). See, e.g., Andy Irwin et al., Feature 
Comment: DOD Amends DFARS To Bolster Cybersecurity of Unclassified 
Contractor Systems, Answering Some Questions and Raising Others, 55 
GC ¶ 383:
Contractors “subject to the final rule (as implemented by a 
contract clause) will have to observe three requirements: (1) 
adopting and implementing certain NIST IT security standards; 
(2) mandatory reporting of cybersecurity incidents to DOD; and 
(3) flowing these requirements to subcontractors, and perhaps 
reporting a subcontractor’s cyber incidents to DOD….
The rule … requires contractors that enter into a Government 
contract containing the new cybersecurity clause to implement 
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certain NIST information systems security procedures in their 
project, enterprise or company-wide unclassified IT system. … [T]
he standards specified by the rule cover 14 areas of information 
security … [including] access control, awareness and training, 
accountability, configuration management, contingency planning, 
identification and authentication, incident response, maintenance, 
media protection, physical and environmental protection, program 
management, risk assessment, system and communications 
protection, and system and information integrity....
[T]he new rule also contains a reporting requirement. 
Contractors subject to the rule must report within 72 hours to 
DOD, via an internet portal, if there is a cyber incident that 
affects covered controlled technical information. The exact scope 
of this reporting requirement is not clear…. 
See also, Brian E. Finch & Justin A. Chiarodo, Feature Comment: 10 Things 
Government Contractors Should Know About Cybersecurity Compliance, 
55 GC ¶ 364, which provide a helpful outline rubric:
1. Cyber threats are as great as ever. ... The Defense Science 
Board recently documented a number of breached systems, 
and the list is breathtaking…. The Edward Snowden/National 
Security Agency scandal is perhaps the best example…. [T]hese 
attacks show no signs of slowing down, and, in fact, they are 
likely to get worse…. Government contractors are particularly 
vulnerable in this environment, given the types of information 
they have access to and maintain.
2. The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 
(FISMA), 44 USCA § 3544, remains the key statute underlying 
federal cybersecurity regulations for Government contractors.
3. FISMA is only one of many laws that impact cybersecurity 
compliance…. A June 2013 report by the Congressional 
Research Service identified more than 50 statutes addressing … 
cybersecurity, either directly or indirectly, and more legislation 
in the pipeline. See “Federal Laws Relating to Cybersecurity: 
Overview and Discussion of Proposed Revisions” (CRS 7-5700)….
4. Efforts to standardize approaches in federal procurement 
remain works in progress.
5. What remains for contractors is a piecemeal approach.
6. Read your solicitations and contracts. … Government 
contractors should carefully review solicitations on which they 
bid and contracts that they are awarded.
7. Know that fingers will likely point to you when it comes to 
accountability.
8. Be mindful of the risks. … [Among other things,] ensure that 
regulatory requirements are properly included and that risk 
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and indemnity issues related to cybersecurity are appropriately 
addressed[.]
9. Consider risk transfer…. [C]ontractors should plan as though 
cybersecurity will be at their expense…. 
10. Develop – and review – your cybersecurity plan. … [F]ormalize 
and centralize cybersecurity oversight, with a plan addressing 
regulatory compliance, crisis management, investigations, 
reporting, risk assessment, technology, contract management 
and public relations….
See also, East Asia Accounts for Half of Unauthorized Attempts to Access 
Classified Technologies, DSS Reports, 55 GC ¶ 234; ABA Section Recom-
mends Flexible Cybersecurity Contracting Standards, 55 GC ¶ 210; David 
Z. Bodenheimer & Elliott R. Golding, Feature Comment: Regulating Cyber-
security On a Piecemeal Basis—Can the Executive Order Harmonize the 
Cyber Law Patchwork?, 55 GC ¶ 198; Industry Group Suggests Consistent 
Approach in Developing Cybersecurity Measures, 55 GC ¶ 124; Mary Beth 
Bosco & Norma Krayem, Feature Comment: Cybersecurity 101 For Govern-
ment Contractors, 55 GC ¶ 100.
VI. NOW IS THE WINTER OF OUR DISCONTENT: LESS 
SPENDING, MORE CRITIQUE AND CRITICISM (AND 
ALAS, PLENTIFUL FUEL FOR THE FIRE) 
Granted, it’s no wonder that government procurement, contractors, or 
doing business with the government failed to gain ground in the court of 
public opinion last year.
• Allegations and finger-pointing highlight contractor involve-
ment in the poorly managed implementation of the Affordable Care Act 
regime. See, e.g., Jerry Markon & Alice Crites, HealthCare.gov contract: 
Politics not a factor, but neither were firm’s ties to failed projects, Wash. 
Post (Dec. 22, 2013)(“CGI Federal … won the job because of what federal 
officials deemed a ‘technically superior’ proposal.... [But n]ot considered 
in the 2011 selection process was the history of numerous executives …, 
who had come from another company that had mishandled at least 20 
other government  information technology projects more than a decade 
ago.”), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/healthcar-
egov-contract-politics-not-a-factor-but-neither-were-firms-ties-to-failed-
projects/2013/12/22/61728fca-6753-11e3-a0b9-249bbb34602c_story.
html?hpid=z1; Lydia Depillis, Meet CGI Federal, the company behind 
the botched launch of HealthCare.gov, WonkBLoG (Oct. 16, 2013)(“CGI 
Federal is a relative newbie on the U.S. government IT contracting 
scene. It bought … American Management Systems in 2004, but only 
started ramping up business after 2008, and accelerated in 2010 with 
the $1.1 billion acquisition of … IT contractor Stanley Inc.”), available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/16/
meet-cgi-federal-the-company-behind-the-botched-launch-of-healthcare-
gov/. See also, Robert Pear Sharon, From the Start, Signs of Trouble at 
Health Portal, nY tImes (Oct. 12, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/10/13/us/politics/from-the-start-signs-of-trouble-at-health-
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portal.html?pagewanted=all&smid=tw-share&_r=1, noting, among other 
things:
[T]he government was so slow in issuing specifications that the 
firm did not start writing software code until this spring…. As 
late as the last week of September, officials were still changing 
features of the Web site … and debating whether consumers 
should be required to register and create password-protected 
accounts before they could shop for health plans. … One highly 
unusual decision… proved critical: the Medicare and Medicaid 
agency assumed the role of project quarterback, responsible for 
making sure each separately designed database and piece of 
software worked with the others, instead of assigning that task 
to a lead contractor. Some people … seriously doubted that the 
agency had the in-house capability to handle such a mammoth 
technical task of software engineering while simultaneously 
supervising 55 contractors. An internal … progress report … 
identified a lack of employees ‘to manage the multiple activities 
and contractors happening concurrently’ as a ‘major risk’ to the 
whole project.
• Bubbling beneath the surface of the story involving 2013’s dramatic 
security breach is the issue of limiting or better controlling contractor 
access to classified information. Tracy Connor, Growth of intel outsourc-
ing no secret, but now Congress taking notice, nBC neWs (June 15, 2013) 
(“A growing chorus on Capitol Hill is questioning whether U.S. intel-
ligence agencies are farming out too much work to private contractors 
like Edward Snowden, the Booz Allen Hamilton systems analyst who has 
claimed credit leaking classified details about surveillance programs.”), 
available at http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/15/18940842-
growth-of-intel-outsourcing-no-secret-but-now-congress-taking-notice?lite. 
; Jordan Weissmann, Edward Snowden: Exhibit A for How Washington 
Blows Money on Contractors, atLantIC (June 10, 2013) (“maybe Snowden 
really was just worth his $200,000 salary – he did have a security clear-
ance ... and had worked for the CIA and for Dell as an NSA contractor. Or 
maybe the government contracting just lends itself to absurd payscales.”), 
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/06/
edward-snowden-exhibit-a-for-how-washington-blows-money-on-contrac-
tors/276714/; Robert O’Harrow Jr.,The outsourcing of U.S. intelligence 
raises risks among the benefits, Wash. Post (June 9, 2013) (“Edward 
Snowden, the 29-year-old ... source ... has worked at Booz Allen Ham-
ilton and other intelligence contractors. Before entering the private 
sector, he says he held a series of technical jobs at the Central Intelli-
gence Agency.”), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/the-outsourcing-of-us-intelligence-raises-risks-among-
the-benefits/2013/06/09/eba2d314-d14c-11e2-9f1a-1a7cdee20287_story.
html?hpid=z1. On a related note, see Sean Reilly, Background check 
contractor at risk of suspension, experts say: USIS faces fraud claims in 
lawsuit, federaL tImes (Nov. 3, 2013) (discussing False Claims Act lawsuit 
filed against USIS, which “performs almost two-thirds of the background 
checks for security clearances that are extended to millions of federal 
employees and contractors…. The … [relator] alleges that USIS system-
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atically submitted background investigations … that were incomplete or 
not properly reviewed….”), available at http://www.federaltimes.com/
article/20131103/PERSONNEL01/311030001/Background-check-
contractor-risk-suspension-experts-say. 
• Only in a busy year like 2013, could “Fat Leonard,” Glenn Marine, 
and the Navy’s sensational contracting scandal rank third (at best) in 
terms of media interest. Christoper Drew & Danielle Ivory, In Navy Bill-
ing Scandal, a Third Company Puts an Executive on Leave, nY tImes (Dec. 
19, 2013) (“Multinational Logistic Services, known as MLS, is the Navy’s 
largest ship supply company, with $346 million in contracts for ports in 
Africa, the Mediterranean, Central America and the Pacific.”) available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/20/us/in-navy-billing-scandal-
a-third-company-puts-an-executive-on-leave.html?smid=fb-share&_r=0; 
Christoper Drew & Danielle Ivory, Navy Was Warned of Contractor at 
Center of Bribery Inquiry, nY tImes (Nov. 20, 2013) (“Emails obtained by 
criminal investigators show that from 2009 to early 2011, several ship 
crews and contracting officials filed complaints about … ‘gold-plated’ 
fees for fuel, port security and other services.”) available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/11/21/us/navy-was-warned-of-contractor-in-
bribery-scandal.html; Craig Whitlock, Two admirals face probe in Navy 
bribery scheme, Wash. Post (Nov. 8, 2013) (“Vice Adm. Ted ‘Twig’ Branch, 
the service’s top intelligence officer, and Rear Adm. Bruce F. Loveless, the 
Navy’s director of intelligence operations, were placed on leave … and 
their access to classified material was suspended[.]”), available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/two-admirals-face-
probe-in-navy-bribery-scheme/2013/11/08/d2dc063a-48d8-11e3-bf0c-
cebf37c6f484_story.html; Craig Whitlock, Senior officer, NCIS agent 
are among those arrested in Navy bribery scandal, Wash. Post (Oct. 
19, 2013) (Glen Marine “targeted Navy personnel serving in Asia and 
plied them with prostitutes, cash, luxury hotel rooms, plane tickets and 
... tickets to a Lady Gaga concert in Thailand.”), available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/senior-officer-ncis-
agent-are-among-those-arrested-in-navy-bribery-scandal/2013/10/19/
e9a1e9b6-3753-11e3-bda2-e637e3241dc8_story.html. See also, Inchcape 
Shipping Services Holding, Ltd., B-402687.10, B-402687.11 (Dec 9, 2013) 
(protest of post-suspension reprocurements), http://www.gao.gov/as-
sets/660/659645.pdf. 
• We are somewhat fatigued by the ever-increasing Congressional 
drumbeat demanding automatic suspension and debarment of contrac-
tors or, in the alternative, a government-wide commitment to refusing to 
do business with a larger slice of the private sector. The clear message 
from Congress is that it wants more heads to roll – scalp counting mat-
ters! – and, that cannot be good news for contractors or government cus-
tomers in the long term. Industry, Watchdog Groups Take Opposing Tack 
on Proposed SUSPEND Act, 55 GC ¶ 358; House Oversight Committee 
Passes Suspension and Debarment Overhaul, 55 GC ¶ 351; Todd Canni 
& Jason Carey, Feature Comment: Contractors Beware – COFC Endorses 
Clandestine Debarment System, 55 GC ¶ 251; Persistent S&D Weaknesses 
Remain, Witnesses Tell Committee, 55 GC ¶ 188; House Oversight Chair 
Ponders Centralizing Suspension and Debarment Functions, 55 GC ¶ 54. 
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• Lenny Bernstein, Workers turned EPA warehouse in Landover 
into personal rec rooms, audit finds, Wash. Post (June 5, 2013), avail-
able at http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/
workers-turned-epa-warehouse-in-landover-into-personal-rec-rooms-audit-
finds/2013/06/05/ed5514fc-ce17-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html. 
“In [a Landover EPA warehouse, employees of Apex Logistics] … created 
personal rec rooms with televisions, radios, chairs and couches … photos, 
calendars and pinups … books, magazines and videos … a refrigerator and 
… a microwave … [and] a 30-by-45-foot athletic center, cobbled together 
from ‘surplus’ EPA gym equipment and … a music system provided via 
‘other agency inventory items….’”
• Department of Justice, Press Release, Security Contractors Plead 
Guilty in Virginia to Illegally Obtaining $31 Million from Contracts In-
tended for Disadvantaged Small Businesses, (Mar 18, 2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/March/13-crm-323.html. Among 
other things:
Hedman admitted that in 2003 he created a shell company… 
to ensure he could continue to gain access to 8(a) contracting 
preferences…. Hedman selected an employee, Dawn Hamilton 
… to serve as a figurehead owner based on her Portuguese 
heritage and history of social disadvantage, when in reality the 
new company would be managed by Hedman…. [T]hey falsely 
claimed that Hamilton formed and founded the company and 
that she was the only member of the company’s management. 
They continued to mislead the SBA through 2012, even lying 
to the SBA to overcome a protest filed by another company 
accusing Hedman’s former company and the shell company of 
being inappropriately affiliated.
 • Stephanie Mencimer, The War of Rape: What happened to Jamie 
Leigh Jones in Iraq?, Washington Monthly (November/December 2013), 
available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/november_
december_2013/features/the_war_of_rape047355.php?page=all. In 2007, 
Jamie Leigh Jones appeared on television and before Congress detailing 
how, as an inexperienced 20-year-old, she had been raped in the Green 
Zone while working as a Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR) contractor. After 
a lengthy trial, the jury awarded her no damages against KBR, and the 
judge subsequently ordered Jones to pay KBR $145,000 for its legal costs. 
Among other things, the author details that Jones: (1) had an extensive 
history of depression, hypochondria, and/or psychosomatic symptoms; and 
(2) that, at “Camp Hope Army hospital in 2005, it was the fourth time in 
five years that she had told a medical professional that she’d been raped[.]” 
The author bemoans that: “The media, which had played such a major 
role in publicizing Jones’s story, all but ignored the grand finale. ... The 
verdict represented an epic media failure, and one that could have been 
avoided if reporters … had heeded some of the early warning signs....”
• We would be remiss if – unlike the nation’s media sources – we 
failed to report that, as of the close of 2013, more than 3,000 contractor 
personnel have died supporting the U.S. Government’s efforts in Iraq and 
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Afghanistan (and the total exceeds 3,150 once deaths in Kuwait are in-
cluded). In addition, more than 80,000 contractor personnel have suffered 
injuries. Defense Base Act Case Summary by Nation, http://www.dol.
gov/owcp/dlhwc/dbaallnation.htm. See also, Jabeen Bhatti, Interpreters 
wait for promise of life in USA, usa todaY (Oct. 19, 2013) (“The United 
States has long been aware of the danger [interpreters] put themselves 
in by helping the Americans. So it created a special visa for them to come 
to work and live in the USA once their assignment was up.... [Yet, with 
these programs expired (or expiring),] of the 25,000 visas allocated by 
law to Iraqis …, fewer than 6,000 have been issued since 2008 ... [and of] 
the 8,750 available for Afghans, fewer than 1,200 have been granted.”), 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/10/19/
afghanistan-iraq-interpreters/2958153/. 
• More than two decades of litigation (in the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court), cumulative fatigue, or economic efficiency, appear to 
have produced a settlement in the A-12 litigation (originally filed in June 
of 1991, following the January 1991 contract termination). Conceptually, 
pending Congressional approval, Boeing (formerly McDonnell Douglass) 
and General Dynamics each would provide the Navy the equivalent of $198 
million in design, production, and delivery costs on existing programs (for 
a total of just under $400 million). David Alexander, After two decades, 
U.S. Navy near deal to settle ‘Flying Dorito’ suit, reuters (Aug. 2, 2013), 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/02/usa-defense-
flyingdorito-idUSL1N0G31T620130802; Jen DiMascio, Administration 
Seeks Authority For U.S. Navy To Receive A-12 Settlement, avIatIon Week 
(May 21, 2013), available at http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.
aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_05_21_2013_p0-580920.xml. 
• David Francis, Pentagon’s Failure to Audit Contracts Wastes Bil-
lions, fIsCaL tImes (May 21, 2013) (“To put the 24,000-case logjam in 
context, the agency conducted 7,390 audits in 2011 (the last year data is 
available). Using that rate, DCAA would not clear its current backlog until 
at least 2016. That’s not counting any new cases that the agency must au-
dit.”), available at: http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/05/21/
Pentagons-Failure-to-Audit-Contracts-Wastes-Billions#page1. 
Lest we end on an optimistic note, 2013 offered plentiful critique – from 
GAO, the Inspectors Generals, and the oversight community – across a 
broad range of issues. See also, among others, Commerce Needs to Improve 
T&M/LH Contract Award, Administration, 55 GC ¶ 373; Navy Needs Up-
dated Policy to Address Shipbuilding Deficiencies, GAO Says, 55 GC ¶ 375; 
IG Questions NASA’s Award-Fee Contract Use, 55 GC ¶ 374; IG Catalogs 
SBA’s Most Serious Management Challenges, 55 GC ¶ 359; FPS Contract 
Guard Program Oversight Continues to Fall Short, GAO Finds, 55 GC ¶ 
348; CRS Examines Improper Payment Recovery Efforts, 55 GC ¶ 340; 
IG Questions DCAA Audit of Contractor Business System, 55 GC ¶ 339; 
VA Needs Better Oversight or Training Conference Spending, IG Reports, 
55 GC ¶ 323; DOE IG Finds Poor Financial Management in Alternative 
Energy Program, 55 GC ¶ 322; DOD Insourcing Cost Comparison Guid-
ance Does Not Include All Costs, GAO Finds, 55 GC ¶ 314; Postal Service 
9-17
NOTES
© 2014 Thomson Reuters
Noncompetitive Purchases Lack Documentation, IG Reports, 55 GC ¶ 313; 
DARPA Did Not Consistently Follow Requirements for BAA Contracts, 
IG Says, 55 GC ¶ 287; National Lab Needs to Improve T&M Subcontract 
Market Research, Price Analysis, 55 GC ¶ 262; Army Not Complying With 
FAR Cost-Reimbursement Rules, IG Finds, 55 GC ¶ 278; Navy Not Fol-
lowing Software Licensing Best Practices, 55 GC ¶ 260; DOT Still Using 
Cost-Reimbursement Contracts Despite FAR Requirements, IG Says, 55 
GC ¶ 254; DOT SmartPay Card Controls Not Always Followed, IG Says, 
55 GC ¶ 243; DOD Efforts to Improve Service Contracts Lack Assessment 
Processes, GAO Reports, 55 GC ¶ 215; IRS Purchase Card Program Needs 
Stronger Internal Controls, Tax IG Says, 55 GC ¶ 207; FAS Managers In-
terfering With COs’ Contract Administration, GSA IG Finds, 55 GC ¶ 179; 
DOD Continues to Struggle to Modernize Business Systems, 55 GC ¶ 172; 
Commercial Procurement Practices Could Improve Services Contracting 
GAO Says, 55 GC ¶ 169; IG Finds IRS Did Not Comply With FAR Revisions 
Addressing Cost-Reimbursement Contracts, 55 GC ¶ 155; GAO Finds VA 
Construction Delays, Cost Overruns, 55 GC ¶ 153; MDA Acquisition Would 
Benefit from Best Practices, GAO Says, 55 GC ¶ 145; Poor EPA Superfund 
Site Planning Delayed Toxicity Assessment, 55 GC ¶ 139; NSF Early Ac-
quisition Planning Needs Additional Guidance, GAO Says, 55 GC ¶ 111; 
DOD Major IT Acquisitions Fell Short of Targets, GAO Finds, 55 GC ¶ 
110; DOD Competition Rate Continues to Drop, GAO Finds, 55 GC ¶ 109 
(noting a five-year decline from 62.6 to 57.1 percent, and recognizing the 
impact of budgetary uncertainty on acquisition planning); IG Finds DOE 
Approved Above Market Rate Contractor Executive Salaries, 55 GC ¶ 102; 
IG Finds Flaws With Air Force Use, Documentation of Cost-Reimbursable 
Contracts, 55 GC ¶ 101; MAS Pre-Award Audits Raise Several Concerns, 
GSA IG Reports, 55 GC ¶ 86; Most DCAA FY 2010 Audits in IG’s Sample 
Lacked Professional Judgment, 55 GC ¶ 84 (although no effort has been 
made by the IGs to quantify any potential impact of DCAA’s shortcomings 
on contractors or business transactions); CSB Finds Acquisition Regula-
tions For Fireworks Disposal Fall Short, 55 GC ¶ 77 (demonstrating that 
no issue is too arcane to mandate government-wide policy guidance in the 
FAR, CSB recommended increased FAR responsibility standards for pro-
spective contractors and subcontractors handling explosive and hazardous 
materials); Nonprofits Decry Wasteful Government Programs, 55 GC ¶ 43. 
Fortunately, there will plenty for us to discuss in 2014.
9-18
